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The postwar development of United States export control poli-
cies comprises two contrasting historical periods.' The first period,
from 1948-1969, was a time of relatively stringent control while the
second, from 1969 to the present, has been one of gradually increas-
ing liberalization. The Export Control Act of 1949 (ECA)2 was pri-
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1. Export controls were imposed for the first time as a necessity of war in 1940 immedi-
ately before the fall of France. Comment, Export Controls, 58 YALE L.J. 1325, 1328 (1949).
However, statutory controls have long existed to regulate the export of specified commodities
as strategic and economic measures. Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil" Its Legality
Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591, 611-12 (1974). Shihata cites the following
examples: United States Shipping Act of 1916, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 808, 835, 46 C.F.R.
§ 221.5 etseq. (regulation of sale and transfer to foreign registry of U.S. citizen-owned ships);
Act of October 16, 1917, 12 U.S.C. §§ 95a, 95b; 31 C.F.R. § 54.1 etseq. and the Gold Reserve
Act of 1934, 31 U.S.C. § 440 (export of gold); Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717b; 18
C.F.R. § 153.1 et seq. (export of natural gas); Tobacco Seed and Plant Exportation Act of
1940, 7 U.S.C. § 576 (export of tobacco seed and live tobacco plants); Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 7 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.; 68 Stat. 454 (export of
subsidized U.S. agricultural commodities to communist countries); Atomic Energy Act of
1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (export of atomic materials and facilities). See also International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (1976)
(codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
2. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1968). In addition to the ECA, another important statute
was the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act (Battle Act), 22 U.S.C. §§ 1611 et seq.
(1970). Its purpose was to exert economic pressure on specific countries by imposing broad
restrictions on the export of military and strategic goods and technology from the United
States to countries which permitted the sale of listed controlled items to embargoed destina-
tions. There also was the Mutual Security Act of 1954, 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (1970), which
placed licensing controls on arms, ammunition and other war-related exports. For other
examples of Cold War-era restrictions on exports to communist countries, see, e.g., 15 Fed.
Reg. 9040 (1950) (codified at 31 C.F.R. Part 500 (1971)) (trade embargo with People's Re-
public of China and with North Korea); 28 Fed. Reg. 6974 (1963) (codified at 31 C.F.R. Part
515 (1970)) (trade embargo with Cuba); 29 Fed. Reg. 6010 (1964) (codified at 31 C.F.R. Part
500 (1971)) (trade embargo with North Vietnam). The result of these and other severe re-
strictions on exports to the Sino-Soviet bloc was a low volume of trade as compared with
Western Europe. The American share of East-West trade prior to 1973 was less than four
percent. Hoya, The Changing U.S. Regulation of East-West Trade, 12 COLUM. J. TRANS-
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marily responsible for the Cold War restrictions on trade. It
remained in force for twenty years until superseded by the Export
Administration Act of 1969, 3 as amended (EAA of 1969).4
The stimulus for the ECA was the United States concern for
the preservation of national security against the advances of the So-
viet Union and Eastern Europe. These fears were realized in 1948
with the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Block-
ade. The ECA of 1949 sought to promote the goals of national
security by requiring a license for the export to any country (gener-
ally except to Canada) of all goods or technology which might en-
danger national security.5 The purpose of the EAA of 1969 was
similar,6 but that statute also reflected greater appreciation of the
complex relationship between foreign policy and domestic affairs
and was intended to liberalize United States export policies and
conform them to the changing international trade and political situ-
ation. It proposed to attain that objective mainly through the ex-
pansion of trade relations with communist countries.7 Further
relaxation was sought through the 1977 Amendments to the EAA
of 1969 by qualifying the broad discretion of the President's author-
ity.' Thus, the EAA of 1969 together with its amendments at-
NAT'L L. 1, 4-6 (1973). For historical background on legislation leading to the 1979 Act, see
generally Comment, Reconciliation of Conflicting Goals in the Export Administration Act of
1979-A Delicate Balance, 12 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 415 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Recon-
ciliation]; Comment, The Export Administration Act of 1979.: An Examination of Foreign
Availability ofControlled Goods and Technologies, 2 Nw J. INT'L L. & Bus. 179 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as Examination].
3. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2401-13 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
4. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1976 &
Supp. 1 1977) (current versions at Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (to be codified at 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2419) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Amendments].
5. Hoya, supra note 2, at 6.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 25. The cause of this liberalized policy is attributed by Mr. Hoya to dissent
over the Vietnam War and the consequent disillusionment with East-West confrontation. As
the opposition of the American public increased, the opportunity arose for proposals to aid
peaceful coexistence, one of which was increased East-West trade. Another factor was that
the arguments in favor of expanded trade finally overcame the rigid logic against it. Id. at
28. The pro-trade arguments have been summarized as follows: (1) increased trade would
bring economic benefit to the U.S. based on the principle of comparative advantage; (2) as a
matter of human experience, trade improves the political relations between countries;
(3) even though trade might be detrimental to national security, there is little that the U.S.
can do to affect the elements of communist policy that are opposed to U.S. interests;
(4) trade is likely in any case to induce communist nations to adopt policies and practices
favorable to the U.S. Id. at 32-36.
8. The 1977 Amendments, supra note 4, required the President, prior to adopting an
export licensing policy, to consider not only the communist or non-communist status of the
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tempted to balance the residual Cold War anxiety over Soviet
military power, on the one hand, with the increased pressure from
the United States exporting community for more open trade poli-
cies on the other.9
The trend toward greater flexibility of export controls has con-
tinued with the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA of
1979).10 Congress optimistically asserted that the new Act was
needed in order to extend and revise its constitutionally granted
authority to regulate exports. The Act authorizes the revision of the
lists of products regulated through export licenses and is designed
to achieve consistency in the export control policies of the United
States while facilitating improved cooperation with allies." In ad-
dition, Congress recognized as a matter of policy "the strong pre-
sumption that citizens should be free to engage in international
commerce except in instances where regulation is clearly needed to
advance important public interests."' 2 As a consequence, private
exporters may be led to expect greater freedom to engage in inter-
national commercial transactions and to find government regula-
tion through export controls to be the exception. To protect the
national interest, the EAA of 1979 seeks, therefore, to harmonize
the diverse and evolving realities of world trade and international
politics with the interests of United States exporters and those of
the federal government.
The concern of this Article is with the administrative and pro-
cedural provisions established by the EAA of 1979, which are
aimed at resolving the confficting export interests of private export-
destination country but also that country's present and potential relationship to the United
States, the present and potential relationship to countries friendly or hostile to the United
States, and the country's willingness and ability to control reexport of United States export
items. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(b)(2)(A). Another important change was to require the Presi-
dent to consider the foreign availability of an export before imposing export controls. Thus,
the export by American sellers of goods readily available in other countries and of compara-
ble quality could be restricted only if the President reasonably believed that United States
security would be threatened in the absence of such controls. Id. § 2403(b)(2)(B). See Com-
ment, "Export Licensing: Uncoordinated Trade Repression," 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
333, 340-41 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Export Licensing].
9. Hoya, supra note 2, at 28; Export Licensing, supra note 8, at 337. See also Metzger,
Federal Regulation and Prohibition of Trade with Iron Curtain Countries, 29 LAW & CONTEM.
PROB. 1000 (1964) (arguing that trade restrictions with communist countries have not suc-
cessfully weakened these governments and predicting gradual relaxation of them.)
10. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Cum. Supp. 1979) [hereinafter cited as EAA of 1979].
11. Senate Report No. 96-169, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2463, 2464-65 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
12. Id. at 2466.
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ers and the government. The extent to which the licensing require-
ments and procedural provisions of the 1979 Act implement or
inhibit the policy of expanded freedom which Congress intended to
give exporters is analyzed, and the manner in which the policy is
balanced with the government's mandate to protect United States
interests through export controls is considered.
The methodology chosen is to test the 1979 Act for internal
consistency by determining the extent that its operational frame-
work advances or frustrates congressional purposes, especially with
respect to the private sector. I shall attempt to show that while the
1979 Act is designed to ease export procedures as compared to the
1969 Act, and to accomodate changing world realities, it neverthe-
less preserves the approach of its predecessors by favoring the Ex-
ecutive. The 1979 Act grants broad discretion to the President
without requiring him to show significant foreign policy or national
security interests. As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to briefly
present the constitutional framework on which the law of export
controls rest.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
In the realm of foreign affairs the powers of Congress and of
the Executive are broader than those in the area of domestic affairs.
The United States Government's foreign affairs power is due pri-
marily to express constitutional provisions and recognition by the
Supreme Court of the long-standing policy that the constitutional
authority of the political branches must be given wider scope if the
Government is to act effectively in the international arena. These
broader powers are recognized both on a day-to-day basis and in
formulating long-range foreign policy.
Each branch of the federal government (Congress, Executive,
Judiciary) possesses powers over the conduct of the foreign affairs
of the United States. These powers derive directly or implicitly
from the Constitution and, as the Supreme Court stated in United
States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp. ,1I3 from the incidents of sover-
eignty inherited from the British Crown and external to the Consti-
tution. 4 The scope of foreign affairs powers has eluded precise
13. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
14. Id. at 319. Mr. Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority in Curtiss-Wright, rea-
soned that the states were originally sovereign and had derived this characteristic from En-
gland. The Constitution merely allocated powers (previously resting exclusively with the
states) between the states and the federal government. Nevertheless, Justice Sutherland con-
Vol. 12
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definition and the resulting uncertainty of limits within which the
coequal branches may operate has, in turn, engendered institu-
tional competition and conflict that is sometimes difficult to resolve.
A. Powers of Congress
With respect to Congress, certain of its foreign affairs powers
are enumerated in the Constitution 5 while others are implied by or
derived from its express authority. 6 Indeed, the role of Congress
in foreign affairs is essential, whether its power is exercised pursu-
ant to explicit or implicit authorization, because the success or fail-
ure of a particular foreign policy could depend on congressional
support. 17
Among explicit foreign affairs powers, the exclusive power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations under Article I, section 8,
clause 3 of the Constitution, has been exercised frequently through-
out the history of the United States.' 8 The Supreme Court has sug-
gested, 9 that Congress has yet to reach the constitutional
limitations of its foreign affairs powers.2" While the function of the
tinued, the constitution should not be deemed to exhaust the federal government's foreign
affairs powers. Id. The view that the federal government, particularly the Executive, derives
its powers from international law and practice has been strongly criticized by several com-
mentators. See, e.g., Berger, The Presidential Monopoly fForeign Affairs, 71 MICH. L. REV.
1 (1972); Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power. An Analysis o/Mr. Justice Sutherland's The-
ory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946). See also L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 19-26 (1972).
15. The Constitution catalogues eleven such powers. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
16. The existence of Congress' implied powers has been validated by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387
U.S. 253 (1967); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). See also L. HENKIN,
supra note 14, at 326 n.39. The "necessary and proper" clause, as some commentators point
out, has been construed to imply the power of Congress to enact legislation limiting the scope
of the Executive's foreign affairs power. Id., cl. 18. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 177 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK]. In
addition, congressional appropriations under the "spending power" clause determine the fate
of foreign aid programs. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See NOWAK, supra, at 177.
17. See generally NOWAK, supra note 16, at 176-79.
18. L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 69.
19. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied
390 U.S. 956 (1968), rehearing denied 390 U.S. 1037 (1968) (congressional foreign affairs
power authorized Court to alter act of state doctrine as previously recognized by Executive);
Blackman v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). Cf. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (promulgation of alien
immigration and registration laws on basis of foreign affairs powers).
20. L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 74-76; NOWAK, supra note 16, at 178-79. See also
Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Rela-
tions, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 922-23 (1959).
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federal courts is to designate those limitations, the Judiciary is ap-
parently disinclined to establish a more exacting standard because
it might unduly limit the need for flexibility in so complex, unstable
and sensitive an area as foreign affairs.
Besides Congress' direct involvement in foreign affairs, the
Supreme Court has held that Congress is not prohibited by the
Constitution from making relatively broad, though not unlimited,
delegations of authority to the Executive and to administrative
agencies.2' Indeed, the Constitution is significantly less restrictive
about Congressional delegation in foreign affairs than it is with re-
spect to domestic matters. The Supreme Court ascribes this
broader authority, to conduct foreign affairs through delegation of
authority, to the recognition of the need by Congress for greater
discretion and flexibility in the implementation of foreign policy.
22
Nevertheless, as Professor Tribe points out, there are definite
constitutional limitations on the ability of Congress to delegate
power to the Executive in foreign affairs.23 He also suggests that
21. See, e.g., The Brig Aurora, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813), where suspension of a
trade embargo was linked to the Executive's finding of facts concerning the conduct of for-
eign countries; FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976), where the Court upheld
delegation of authority to the President to make import adjustments for an article pending
his finding that the importation thereof threatened national security. It has been suggested,
in addition, that a grant of power to Congress under Article I, section 8 of the CONSTITUTION
implies the power to delegate authority to implement, for example, by means of drafting
regulations or by conditioning the operation of the statute on the finding by the agency of
prescribed facts. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTrIONAL LAW 284-85 (1978). Professor
Tribe also argues that useful and effective delegation of authority is achieved best by includ-
ing standards to guide the exercise of such authority. TRIBE at 287. By contrast, it also has
been suggested that safeguards, rather than standards, be applied to delegated authority in
order to protect against unnecessary and uncontrolled use of discretionary power, and that
failure to include these should be regarded as an improper delegation. K. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TEXT 43-46 (1972). The political theory underlying the delegation question is,
in essence, that where the government derives its authority from the consent of the governed,
every exercise of such authority must be traceable to one of the representative branches for
the purpose of fixing political and legal responsibility. L. TRIBE, supra at 286-87. The valid-
ity of the doctrine that Congress may under the Constitution broadly delegate authority to
the President has been defended by other commentators. See L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at
24.
22. The language of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936),
is instructive:
[C]ongressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and
inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of
discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissable
were domestic affairs alone involved.
Id. at 320. See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
23. L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 160-61. Similarly, Congress is forbidden from enacting
legislation inconsistent with constitutional prohibitions against certain kinds of legislative
action. Id. Moreover, as Professor Tribe argues, certain congressional powers are nondele-
Vol. 12
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such delegation, at the least, cannot be "open-ended." This would
amount to placing legislative power in the hands of an administra-
tive agency.24
B. Powers of the Executive
The powers of the Executive25 to make foreign policy and con-
duct foreign affairs, like those of Congress, are broader than its cor-
responding domestic powers. Aside from the extensiveness of
Executive authority, it is in many situations unchallenged by and
superior to that of the other branches, and may be exclusive in
other circumstances. 26 Unlike Congress, the Executive is not em-
powered to directly regulate foreign commerce; it may only do so if
authorized by statute.27 Moreover, the President is entrusted with
certain implied or inherent powers, especially with respect to fulfil-
ling his duties as Commander-in-Chief in conjunction with the re-
quirement that he "take care" that the laws are faithfully
executed.21 Within the constitutional and statutory limitations im-
gable, as where the Constitution provides that the purposes underlying certain grants of au-
thority would not be served were Congress to delegate such power. He describes a
hypothetical agency established by the Senate for the purpose of approving or rejecting all
future treaties. Such, he argues, would almost certainly violate Article II, § 2 of the CONSTI-
TUTION, which requires that presidentially negotiated treaties can enter into force only upon
"the Advice and Consent of the Senate to the extent of a two-thirds majority." Id. Finally,
Congress may not delegate its "legislative powers" to any agency, although it is constitution-
ally permissable for agencies to write regulations pursuant to legislation. Id.
24. Id. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), from which Professor
Tribe draws support for the principle of restraints on congressional delegations of authority.
25. The President's foreign affairs powers are enumerated in Article II of the CONSTITU-
TION. He is empowered to conclude treaties, and to appoint ambassadors, public ministers
and consuls subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. He is
authorized, as the representative of the United States, to receive ambassadors and public
ministers. Id. § 3. As Commander-in-Chief of the military, he exerts sweeping influence on
the United States' foreign relations. Id. § 2.
26. L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 44, 92-93.
27. See supra note 21 and text accompanying for a discussion of Congress' power to
enact such statutes.
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See NOWAK, supra note 16, at 174. Professor Henkin ar-
gues that under the "take care" clause, the President, as a loyal agent responsible for enforc-
ing federal law, is required "to assure that congressional legislation affecting international
relations (say, a regulation of foreign commerce) is carried out as the law of the land." L.
HENKIN, supra note 14, at 54-55. See also Independent Meat Packers Association v. Butz,
526 F.2d 228 (1975) cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976). Congress has occasionally had reason
to claim that this duty was less than faithfully executed. For example the Turkish invasion
of Cyprus on July 20, 1974, successfully accomplished by means of United States weapons,
caused Congress to declare Turkey "immediately ineligible" for further military assistance
pursuant to federal law. See Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2213 (1970). Termination
of such aid, however, required affirmative action by the Executive, which was not forthcom-
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posed on his authority, the President makes long-range substantive
foreign policy decisions over and above the daily conduct of for-
eign relations.29
C. Powers of the Supreme Court
The Constitution also grants the Supreme Court foreign affairs
powers,3" but unlike the political branches, it, usually refrains from
exercising that power. The Court's basic policy of non-intervention
is historic and is attributed to its hesitancy to act outside of the
scope of express constitutional authority over foreign affairs.3 '
Consequently, the implied foreign affairs power of the- Supreme
Court, to the extent that it exists at all, has not been defined.
Judicial restraint is reflected by the Supreme Court in that it
becomes directly involved in foreign affairs only on matters in
which Congress has been silent.32 It is also reflected by the Court's
ing. Congress eventually circumvented this presidential reluctance and moved to cut off all
military aid to Turkey. Despite opposition from President Ford that the legislative cutoff
weakened his authority, Congress embargoed all military aid to Turkey, a response to an act
of aggression that was unsuccessful and finally abandoned. Balmer, The Use of Conditions in
Foreign Relations Legislation, 7 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 197, 215-19 (1978).
It has been argued that inherent powers, while not unlimited, are encompassed within a
sphere of executive authority which is implied unless expressly limited in the Constitution or
by Congress. L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 159. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926). The executive use of military force without the express authorization of Congress is
most readily justifiable as required to defend the nation from external aggression, i.e., as an
implied or inherent concomitant of sovereignty. L. TiuE, supra note 21, at 173. Even
though the President may be empowered, on those grounds, to make war at his discretion,
Congress can limit or deny this altogether. Similarly, the extent of Congress's authority to
delegate duties to the President is limited by the Constitution. Thus, with respect to war-
making, Congress cannot delegate exclusive authority, absent specific standards, for this
would be an overly broad and unconstitutional delegation. Id. at 173-76. Not to be con-
fused with inherent powers is the concept of executive privilege. Although not mentioned in
the Constitution, this doctrine is invoked by the President when, for whatever reason, he
decides to cloak his activities in secrecy. Id. at 202-203. This doctrine has been endorsed by
the Supreme Court as a privilege devolving from the consitutional doctrine of Separation of
Powers. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). It also has become a useful executive
tool in the conduct of foreign affairs. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I (1953).
29. L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 47, 92-93.
30. The Constitution provides that: "The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
31. NOWAK, supra note 16, at 179.
32. For example, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), a case
with far-reaching impact on U.S. foreign relations, the Court upheld the act of state doctrine
as recognized under international law. The Court held that this doctrine "in its traditional
formulation precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the public
acts of a recognized sovereign foreign power committed within its own territory." Id. at 401.
Vol. 12
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deference to the Executive in foreign affairs where the Court would
otherwise be empowered to act.aa The Court also yields to Con-
gress where there is a superior legislative finding. In that context
the Court recognizes the limitations on its powers and its unfamili-
arity with the questions presented. Leaving Congress relatively
unencumbered in the conduct of foreign affairs is especially appar-
ent in the area of congressional war powers. As these are exercised
in emergencies, they are the constitutional powers the Court is least
likely to restrain.3 4
Finally, the Court occasionally avoids review of congressional
and executive decisions in foreign affairs by finding such matters to
be political questions, and therefore nonjusticiable a5 Cases
presenting such questions are deemed to be improperly before the
Court and instead fall within the constitutionally granted authority
of the political branches.3 6 Thus, it is thought that substantive deci-
It based the decision on the belief that the Court can enact judicial legislation in foreign
relations matters. Id. at 423, 428. Thus, Congress would be required to statutorily change
the act of state doctrine as formulated in Sabbatino. The Hickenlooper Amendment was in
fact an attempt to limit the effect of Sabbatino by reformulating the act of state doctrine
under U.S. law, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(c)(2). The Supreme Court lent support to that legislation
when it denied certiorari in a case in which the statute was challenged. See Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y.) aff'd 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied
390 U.S. 956 (1968). More recently in Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308
(1978), the Court stated that "it is within the exclusive power of the Executive Branch to
determine which nations are entitled to sue." Id. at 320. See Jones v. United States, 137
U.S. 202 (1890), cited in Pfizer for the same principle. See also The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677 (1900) for a discussion of the court's authority to construe international law. See
generally NOWAK, supra note 16, at 179-183.
33. In First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), the
Court recognized the primacy of the Executive in foreign relations and that it should defer to
the Executive when it represented that the application of the act of state doctrine would not
advance U.S. interests. Id. at 767-68. The Court failed to note, however, that even if the
Executive is superior in foreign relations expertise, this does not compel the conclusion that
the Court should defer to whatever the Executive asserts without being cognizant of in-
dependent constitutional questions. The Court's failure to address that question had an un-
settling effect on some of the justices, in particular Mr. Justice Brennan, who stated in dissent
that such deference diminished the integrity and independence of the court. Id. at 773-76,
776-96. He stressed further that any such decisions should be based on constitutional
grounds and not on the representations of the Executive. Id. at 766-96. See also Narenji v.
Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
34. L. TRIBE, supra 21, at 277. There is, however, no apparent theoretical obstacle to
the Court's application of the war powers rationale to non-war powers situations thereby
legitimizing perhaps unreasonably harsh peacetime domestic and foreign relations condi-
tions. Deference to Congress in such situations would, according to Justice Brennan, consti-
tute avoidance of judicial functions. See First National City Bank, at 776-796 (Brennan J.,
dissent). See also NOWAK, supra note 16, at 182-83.
35. Id.
36. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934
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sions in international affairs are better left to Congress and the Ex-
ecutive. The Court thereby eschews an active role in formulating
foreign policy.
D. Division of Foreign Affairs Powers
One of the clearest observations to be made concerning the di-
vision of foreign affairs powers by the Constitution is that no
branch of government absolutely predominates. Instead, the distri-
bution of authority fosters competition for control over foreign af-
fairs, most often between Congress and the Executive. As such
both Congress and the President formulate foreign policy within
their imperfectly defined limitations.37 Congress' main tool for as-
sertion of its policy or political interests is through legislation
designed to limit or control the President's authority. The Presi-
dent, on the other hand, advances the Executive's interests by
means of Executive Agreements 38 and by molding statutory inter-
pretations in its favor.39 While it can be argued with some confi-
(1967); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Oetjan v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297
(1918). See also Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1971). See generally NOWAK, supra
note 16, at 179-80.
37. L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 92-93.
38. The growing reliance on executive agreements (as compared to treaties) bears wit-
ness to the growth of presidential power. See J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 258 (1977). Executive agreements are binding on the United
States if they fall within the President's constitutional or inherent powers or if they are nego-
tiated and ratified by the Executive under previously delegated congressional authority. Id.
at 257. The Supreme Court has endorsed the validity of executive agreements entered into
without congressional approval. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937). Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson J., con-
curring), in which Curtiss- Wright was interpreted as applicable when presidential action har-
monizes with congressional, but not when there is discord. Id. at 635-36, n. 2. See also
Chicago and Southern Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948),
where the Court largely reaffirmed the reasoning of Curtiss- Wright and upheld an executive
order concerning the interests of U.S. citizens with foreign air transportation. Id. at I11;
Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth University, 415 F. Supp. 673 (1980). Executive agree-
ments are limited by the commerce clause from being used in the area of foreign commerce
unless by means expressly authorized by Congress. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204
F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), agldon other grounds 348 U.S. 296 (1955). The Fourth Circuit held
in Capps that the commerce clause authorized Congress to regulate potato price supports by
statute and that an executive agreement which conflicted with this statute was accordingly
void. Id. at 659.
Congress also effectively restrains the President and enforces its authority over foreign
commerce through use of the appropriations power of Article I, § 8 of the Constitution, and
thereby attempts to define the scope of presidential action in a manner consistent with its
own foreign policy interests. See L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 167.
39. In theory, the President is precluded by the advice and consent requirement of Arti-
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dence that the Executive has recently had the advantage over
Congress, the ultimate result of the constitutional allocation of
power is the creation of substantive foreign policy by both
branches.
Thus, while the President is the sole actor in the realm of for-
eign affairs and creates foreign policy, Congress also implements its
own foreign policy objectives through the instrumentality of the
Executive.' An uneasy and often unequal balance is struck be-
tween the political branches of government, with both sides need-
ing flexibility in order to be effective.4' It is especially significant
that the government's foreign affairs powers are subject to constitu-
tional limitations with respect to the treatment of individuals, al-
though those restraints are not as strict in foreign affairs as in
domestic matters.42 While the government's role in international
relations is expansive, it is subordinate to the Constitution and is,
cle II, section 2, of the Constitution from acting unilaterally in the conduct of foreign policy.
L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 166. Professor Henkin points out, in addition, that Congress
curbs presidential power in other ways. These include unenumerated powers that derive
from sovereignty and general powers, such as taxing and spending for the common defense
and general welfare, doing what is "necessary and proper" to implement other powers, and
making appropriations. L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 68. As a practical matter, however,
presidential power is substantially increased by Congress' inability to recognize or compel
the President to recognize foreign states; establish, regulate or break relations with them;
repudiate treaty relationships; or be directly involved in the creation of foreign policy by
announcing doctrines or attitudes of the United States. L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 93.
40. L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 164-65. See also L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 47.
41. See L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 176-78. See also NOWAK, supra note 16, at 176,
wherein it is stated that the President usually predominates. An example of the congres-
sional-executive relationship is the War Powers Resolution, 87 Stat. 555, P.L. 93-148, 93rd
Cong. (H.J. Res. 542, adopted over presidential veto on Nov. 7, 1973). This resolution limits
the President's use of armed forces abroad to sixty days with a thirty day extension. It gives
the President some flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy concerning national security
and allows him to exercise power as commander-in-chief within constitutional and congres-
sional restrictions. It also gives Congress flexibility by allowing it to shorten the sixty day
period by concurrent resolution. The practical problem in this area, however, is that once
the President commits forces abroad, Congress may be unlikely or unwilling to remove them.
See TRIBE, supra note 21, at 173-180. See generally Franck, After the Fall The New Proce-
dural Framiework/or Congressional Control Over the War Power, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 605
(1977).
42. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding federal statu-
tory restrictions on the civil rights of Japanese-Americans during World War II); Hiraba-
yashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. denied 446 U.S. 957 (1980). See Rosado v. Civilitti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 153 (1981). See also L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 210, where it is stated
that the Supreme Court has never denied access to an individual claiming violation of his
constitutional rights as a result of a foreign affairs action on the basis of the political question
doctrine. Professor Tribe points out that the Supreme Court has construed the necessary and
proper clause as authorizing Congress to take action in wartime that would be unconstitu-
11
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therefore, not plenary.
43
II. ANALYSIS OF THE ACT
Like its 1949 and 1969 predecessors, the 1979 Act authorizes
export controls to protect the national security of the United States,
to promote foreign policy interests and to conserve resources and
materials. Export controls may also be used as countermeasures
against nations that restrict United States access to supplies of for-
eign materials. Aside from those purposes a fundamental question
raised by the EAA of 1979 is whether its licensing and procedural
provisions will accomplish the dual purposes of easing trade restric-
tions while promoting the necessary interests of the nation. To a
significant extent, the 1979 Act recognizes that those goals are not
necessarily incompatible and that a more open export control pol-
icy coupled with reasonable restrictions is just as likely to promote
national interests as is a system of sweeping and repressive controls.
While it is difficult to criticize a statute in the area of foreign
affairs only because it demonstrably favors government over pri-
vate interests, the EAA of 1979 nevertheless contains a number of
provisions that present obstacles to the exporter without any appar-
ent easing of the government's burden in the conduct of foreign
affairs. To this extent such provisions seem unnecessary. More-
over, they will tend to frustrate congressional policies which have
been more than three decades in the making. For analytical pur-
poses the following discussion of the Act has been divided into the
general headings of substantive provisions, procedural provisions,
export controls and miscellaneous provisions.
A. Substantive Provisions
The substantive provisions of the EAA of 1979 encompass sec-
tion 2401 (congressional findings) and 2402 (congressional declara-
tion of policy) of the Act.
1. Congressional Findings. In the first section of the Act,
tional in peacetime, including restrictions on individual rights. L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at
167, 276.
43. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). With respect to the role
of the President, the Court in Curtiss- Wright stated that his plenary powers to conduct for-
eign affairs "of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordina-
tion to the applicable provisions of the Constitution." Id. at 320. See Rogers v. Belli, 401
U.S. 815 (1971); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1967); Afroyim v. Rusk, 287 U.S. 253 (1967);
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
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Congress stated nine findings which are expressed as general pro-
positions." The combination of domestic, governmental and in-
ternational findings seems to invite a balancing of competing
interests but gives no explicit guidance as to the priority among a
number of factors taken into account in doing so. Significantly, the
means to achieve this balance is suggested by the new findings (sub-
sections (1), (2), (3) and (6)), 41 all of which recognize the interests of
private exporters to engage in free trade through foreign exports.
Also recognized is the detrimental impact of excessive controls on
the ability to engage in free trade and on the domestic economy.
These interests are stated independently rather than as subject to
the government's national security and foreign policy interests.46
44. These propositions are summarized as follows:
1. Concern that U.S. citizens be able to engage in international trade is a funda-
mental government policy.
2. Exports have economic benefits to the United States and the world, increase
employment and production in the U.S. and reduce inflation by strengthening
the balance of trade and the value of the dollar.
3. It is in the national interest for the government and the private sector to give
high priority to exports.
4. The United States' economic and foreign policy goals may be affected by the
availability of certain materials that the U.S. exports.
5. National security may be threatened by failure to consider whether exports of
goods or technology will contribute significantly to the military potential of
other countries singly or in concert.
6. Uncertainties in export policy can cause domestic business to reduce efforts and
thereby adversely affect the United States' balance of trade.
7. Unreasonable controls on access to world supplies can have widespread polit-
ical and economic effects.
8. Export controls for national security purposes should especially consider the
export of technology and of goods which contribute to the transfer of technol-
ogy that could aid the military potential of other countries and threaten the
security of the United States.
9. Minimal controls on agricultural commodities and products are needed in or-
der to keep domestic agriculture strong and free of government supports, to
achieve a positive balance of payments and to eliminate hunger worldwide.
45. Five interests were recognized under the EAA of 1969. See supra note 3 and accom-
panying text. The first stated that the quantity and composition of products available at
home and abroad may affect the United States' economy and foreign policy. Id. § 2401 (1).
Secondly, Congress stated that it would be detrimental to national security to permit without
restriction the export of certain materials that could make a significant contribution to the
military potential of other nations. Id. § 2401 (2). The third finding expressed concern over
the adverse effects on United States balance of payments that may be caused by unwarranted
export restrictions, especially when such restraints are more severe than those imposed by
countries with whom the United States has defense treaties. Id. § 2401 (3). Fourth, Con-
gress recognized that uncertainty in export policy causes business to curtail foreign trade and
further impairs the United States' balance of payments situation. Id. § 2401 (4). The fifth
finding states that unreasonable restrictions on access to supplies creates political instability
and slows the progress of nations. Id. § 2401 (5).
46. The findings of the EAA of 1969, supra note 3, also were intended to balance na-
tional security and foreign policy interests with those of the private sector to engage in free
trade. The first two findings relate to government interests, while the latter three are
13
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There is no indication in section 2401 that the private sector must
automatically yield whenever the government represents that for-
eign affairs considerations predominate. Instead, private interests
are presumably weighed against those of the government. Al-
though greater consideration is in all probability to be given to for-
eign policy, it should not imply that private interests can be
disregarded. Moreover, subsection (3)47 recognizes that the inter-
ests of government and the private sector are not always adverse
but are often mutual, and subsection (2)48 makes it possible to coor-
dinate those interests. This relationship can be expected to provide
some guidance in the determination of future export policy.
In section 2401, Congress recognizes that export controls have
a serious impact on the exporting community. It follows that the
interests of exporters will be considered and that the harshness of
controls will not be unnecessarily imposed. Thus, section 2401 pur-
ports to recognize an obligation on the part of the government to
fairly represent exporters.
While it may appear that the interests of exporters will carry
more weight than under previous legislation, that expectation may
be frustrated by findings that Congress did not make. Notably ab-
sent from section 2401 is reference to a general rule stating that the
freedom to export is more practicable and beneficial to the United
States economy than a system of controls, or that controls should be
an exceptional measure to be invoked only where military, national
security or similar foreign policy objectives predominate. 49 Also
omitted is a finding as to the impact on export control policies of
broad Executive discretion and the lack of adequate remedies
against abuse of such discretion.50
From the viewpoint of exporters, the failure to address the
problem of discretion makes it difficult to discern consistency and
to predict the development of government export control policies.
It appears that Congress has chosen to place less emphasis on con-
sistency in exchange for allowing the Executive to retain great flex-
ibility. Perhaps Congress believes that the demands of a rapidly
designed to relax trade controls. Although Congress was aware of the benefits of free trade,
it nevertheless subordinated this goal to protection of national security and advancement of
foreign policy. Export Licensing, supra note 8, at 337-38.
47. Supra, note 44.
48. Id.
49. See Senate Report, supra note 11, at 2466.
50. For a discussion of the constitutional dimensions of executive discretion, see supra
notes 25-29 and text accompanying.
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changing global picture necessitates that approach. Thus, what is
consistent for the exporter may appear too rigid and confining for
the government, especially when faced with the potential hostility
of a foreign power. This is not to say that no effort is made to
accord exporters evenhanded treatment, but rather that Congress
did not wish to diminish the efficacy of export controls as a foreign
policy weapon. If that is the crux of Congressional policy, the new
findings announced in subsections (1), (2), (3) and (6) appear to be
little more than desiderata.51
2. Congressional Declarations of Policy. The congressional
declarations of policy in the EAA of 1979, as declared in section
2402, are generally similar to its predecessor, notwithstanding the
new findings in section 2401. The basic policy is to balance the
interests of the government and exporters in a manner consistent
with contemporary political realities and the current status of inter-
national trade. Section 2402 further declares that the new Act seeks
to improve the position of private parties to the greatest extent,
while remaining compatible with foreign policy and national secur-
ity.52
51. Supra, note 44.
52. See Export Licensing, supra note 8, at 336. Policy considerations are summarized as
follows:
1. Uncertainty in export control policy should be minimized, and trade with all
countries encouraged, except those the President determines to have interests
incompatible to our own.
2. Export controls are to be used only after full consideration of economic im-
pact and only if necessary to
-control the export of goods and technology that would significantly contrib-
ute to the military potential of other countries in a manner detrimental to
U.S. national security;
-- control exports to further U.S. foreign policy objectives; and,
-control exports to protect the United States economy from the drain of
scarce resources and to reduce inflation caused by foreign demand.
3. Export controls should be imposed in full cooperation with other nations and
to achieve uniformity of export control policy with countries with which the
United States has defense treaties.
4. Economic resources and trade potential should be utilized to further the
growth of the United States' economy and to further national security and
foreign policy objectives.
5. The United States' policy is
--to oppose boycotts and other restrictive trade practices directed against na-
tions friendly to the U.S. or against United States persons;
---to encourage or require U.S. citizens engaged in foreign trade to refrain
from participating in such boycotts;
-- to develop international cooperation and international rules to ensure free
access to world supplies.
6. Private industry and government should review the desireability of subjecting
products to export controls.
7. Export controls, including license fees, can be used to secure removal by for-
15
Evrard: The Export Administration Act of 1979: Analysis of its Major Prov
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
The most significant features of the policy declarations in sec-
tion 2402 are the two new subsections (1) and (10) which express
the intention of Congress to encourage expanded trade and to in-
crease the trading potential of United States citizens.53 Subsection
(1) strongly implies that Congress intended to promote an ex-
panded export policy unless the Executive believes in the light of
the evidence that export of certain items will be detrimental to na-
tional security, foreign policy or domestic supplies.14 In no sense
can subsection (1) be reasonably interpreted as creating a presump-
tion against export controls in favor of free trade, which the Execu-
tive must rebut. That would be inconsistent with the findings of
section 2401.
It is noteworthy that export controls must be compatible with
basic due process guarantees under subsection (10). Explicit due
process protections are not, however, defined anywhere in the Act,
although they could be inferred from a number of provisions.55
Even if such inferences could not be drawn, the fact that neither the
EAA of 196956 nor the ECA of 194957 was ever challenged as un-
constitutional makes it improbable that any provision of the EAA
of 1979, with its declared policies of greater protection for private
interests, would be struck down on constitutional grounds.5" A
somewhat more tenable prospect is that particular action by the Ex-
ecutive, or by an agency to which the Executive may lawfully sub-
eign countries of restrictions on access to supplies, which increase domestic
inflation, create shortages or attempt to influence U.S. foreign policy, but the
President should first use diplomatic means to effectuate this policy.
8. Export controls can be imposed to prevent and suppress international terror-
ism.
9. Export controls can be imposed in cooperation with countries with whom the
United States has defense treaties in order to restrict the flow of certain goods
and technology to countries that could increase their military potential against
the United States.
10. It is United States policy to give high priority to trade by U.S. citizens except
if in conflict with national security, foreign policy and short supply objectives,
but such controls must be consistent with basic standards of due process.
11. Restrictions on the export of agricultural commodities and products are to beminimized.
53. The EAA of 1969 also encouraged free trade except with those countries determined
to be opposed to U.S. national security interests. EAA of 1969, supra note 3, § 2402(1).
54. See Export Licensing, supra note 8, at 338, where the author states that the Presi-
dent's broad discretion under the 1969 Act and amendments to impose export controls with-
out being required to justify his actions to affected parties weakens the congressional policy
of facilitating exports.
55. See infra notes 133-37, 191 and text accompanying.
56. See supra notes 3-4.
57. See supra note 2.
58. For a discussion of constitutional protections afforded to individuals in the area of
foreign affairs, see supra note 42 and text accompanying.
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delegate authority, 59 may be invalidated as in violation of a specific
statutory provision.
Although Congress appears to be more solicitous toward ex-
porters than ever before, it was nevertheless careful to avoid saying
that any member of the exporting community has a "right" to en-
gage in foreign commerce. Instead as the Senate Report on the Act
makes clear only the "ability" to engage in these activities must be
protected, although permission to export can only be required so as
to effectuate the policies of section 2402.60 Congress' intention may
be interpreted as requiring the Executive to give active considera-
tion to private parties as an important additional factor in foreign
policy decisions. Nevertheless the Executive's failure to consider
private parties' interests does not constitute the denial of a "right"
to export nor is it a violation of due process protections.
Along these lines, a reasonable interpretation of subsections
(1) and (10) is that even if the Executive takes the private sector's
interests into account, and thereafter imposes harsh policies, no
one's "rights" would be violated since the statute only requires that
those interests be considered. Nowhere does it state how much
weight need be given to private parties or that it is an abuse of
discretion to totally disregard private interests after recognizing the
fact that they exist. Apparently, as a matter of policy, the President
is only obligated to express an appreciation for the interests of ex-
porters, but he need not let those interests enter significantly into a
particular decision. The new policies embodied in the Act could,
however, spark litigation on the issue of abuse of such discretion.
Thus, where the President's decision is totally without rational basis
or if he acts beyond the scope of his authority, the courts might be
compelled to invalidate his action or limit its scope, both with re-
spect to a decision based on constitutional grounds and a statuto-
rily-created right.6 '
Despite the pronouncements favoring private interests, the pol-
icy statements do not seem to be an adequate safeguard against
continued needlessly harsh export policies. As a practical matter,
United States foreign policy objectives must be consistent with ex-
isting international trade realities.62 But the policies set forth in
59. See EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2403(e).
60. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 2466; EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2403(d).
61. The role of the courts in the conduct of foreign affairs is discussed supra notes 29-33
and text accompanying.
62. See McQuade, U.S. Trade with Eastern Europe- Its Prospects and Parameters, 3 L.
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section 2402, by failing to sufficiently curb Executive discretion,
would permit unrealistic export controls to continue. Thus, for ex-
ample, the Executive could impose a unilateral control (as opposed
to steps taken as part of a multinational arrangement) on an item
not controlled by other nations but available in similar quantity
and quality, if it deems that such control would protect national
security. This action would be consistent with the policies of sec-
tion 2401, including subsections (1) and (10), provided that the Ex-
ecutive voiced concern for the adverse impact that its action might
have on exporters. The President need not, however, allow the
harshness of this impact to dissuade him if he is convinced that a
given policy is in the national interest. He is likely to be restrained
only if his action in such circumstances is completely unreasonable
or not authorized by the Act. Even if such control is unlikely to be
successful, it would probably stand as a justified exercise of Execu-
tive authority.
An export control adopted under the 1979 Act to effectuate a
national security of foreign policy objective is likely to be valid de-
spite the policy designed to accommodate exporters. Moreover, ec-
onomic and political factors affecting exporters may be irrelevant if
they are deemed to be outweighed by national security or foreign
policy interests. Thus, it is of slight consequence that the United
States lacks a monopoly on the goods or technology it seeks to con-
trol and fails to secure an agreement with allies to place similar
controls on these items.63 In this respect the export control may be
detrimental to the United States balance of trade. It may also be
counterproductive, if trade with countries opposed to United States
interests is encouraged, because it effectively negates the govern-
ment's ability to control certain items. Thus, policies favoring ex-
panded and stable trade appear unlikely to overcome the
presumption favoring national security or foreign policy as formu-
lated by the Executive. Absent standards to guide the Executive in
weighing private interests or economic and political factors, the
& POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 42, 99-100 (1971), who notes that the liberalizing trend in U.S. export
policies is strongly influenced by political and military events abroad, especially those that
take place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the Islamic revolu-
tion in Iran, the Middle East also is likely to be of increasing concern.
63. See also Skol and Peterson, Export Control Laws and Multinational Enterprises, II
INT'L LAW. 29, 29-30 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Skol]. The authors argue that with respect
to multinational enterprises, the United States must bring its export control policies into line
with those of other free world countries and thereby make U.S. policies more effective.
Vol. 12
18
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1 [], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol12/iss1/2
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979
policy of promoting greater participation by the exporting commu-
nity can be readily defeated.
B. Procedural Provisions
Section 2403 of the EAA of 1979 contains several general pro-
visions, some of which are definitional while others are directive or
operational. The most important provision is subsection (a) which
defines the types of export licenses that the Secretary of Commerce
(hereinafter Secretary) may require exporters to obtain. These in-
clude: (1) the validated license, which authorizes the export of a
specific item upon acceptance of the exporter's application' 4 (2) the
qualified general license, which permits multiple exports following
acceptance of an application,65 (3) the general license which allows
items to be exported without the need for an application 66 and
(4) such other types of licenses as may assist the Secretary to en-
force the Act.67 In addition under section 2403(b), the Secretary of
Commerce is responsible for maintaining a commodity control list,
which catalogues controlled goods and technologies for purposes of
national security and foreign policy.68
1. Validated License. The validated license is granted once
the good or technology is determined to be non-strategic in charac-
ter; that is, as one commentator suggests, they must not upgrade the
scientific, technological or industrial capacity of the country to
which they will be exported, or re-exported and used by such coun-
try in a manner detrimental to United States security.69 Other cri-
teria considered before granting a validated license include access
to such goods and technology from other sources, the recipient
country's military posture and the confidence the United States has
in that particular country.70 By contrast, the general license grants
broad permission to export, but it is also conditional and revoca-
ble.7'
A validated license may be required only if (1) the goods or





69. McQuade, supra note 62, at 76.
70. Id. at 71.
71. Id. at 76. Only general and validated licenses were permissible under the EAA of
1969. Cf. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 371, 372 (1978).
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technology sought to be exported is restricted by a multilateral
agreement to which the United States is a party and which requires
the parties to approve the export; (2) other nations are not as ad-
vanced as the United States with respect to the goods or technology;
or (3) the United States is seeking comparable controls on the
goods or technology from other suppliers, and the Secretary judges
a validated license to be necessary pending conclusion of such
agreement.72
Despite the apparent limitations on the use of the. validated
license, the Secretary is given broad discretion to require it. The
validated license is limited to the situations described, unless to do
so is impracticable or inconsistent with national security interests.
73
Impracticability or conflict with the national security are not de-
fined for the purposes of this section, but it appears that a general
finding would suffice which means that the validated license could
swiftly supplant the qualified general license.
2. Qualified General License. The qualified general license
(QGL), an innovation of the 1979 Act, merits special attention.
The great increase in the volume of license applications between
1977 and 1979 created delay and uncertainty for exporters and
threatened to overwhelm licensing agencies with applications.74
Consequently, the 1979 Act attempts to reduce the number of ap-
plications in part by means of the QGL. The purpose of this type
of license is to "permit multiple shipments to a particular consignee
or for a specified end use."' 75 Creation of this license category rep-
resents a departure from the practice of the EAA of 1969 whereby a
separate validated license was required for each shipment made to
destinations in controlled countries.7 6 The mission of the QGL is
to reduce the amount of paperwork and the expense to applicants
and the government without weakening the government's ability to
impose export controls.77
The QGL is intended by Congress to be available instead of a
72. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2404(e)(2).
73. Id.
74. Reconciliation, supra note 2, at 427-28. It has also been pointed out that greater
precision with respect to the commodity control list under §§ 2403(b) and 2404(c) by means
of targeting militarily critical technologies for export controls will further reduce license ap-
plications since control of obsolete and non-critical items does little to protect national secur-
ity. Id. at 429-33.
75. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 2472.
76. EAA of 1969, supra note 3.
77. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 2472.
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validated license where feasible and appropriate.7" However, a
QGL may be required for export of goods or technology restricted
by a multilateral agreement to which the United States is a party,
and that agreement does not require the parties to approve the ex-
port.79 Thus, the QGL may bring substantial improvement in li-
censing procedures where, for example, an exporter makes multiple
shipments of a non-strategic item to a controlled country. That sit-
uation aside, the QGL is not likely to ease the burden on exporters
primarily because the Secretary retains broad discretion to deter-
mine whether a validated license is needed.
The Secretary's discretion is influenced by numerous unpre-
dictable external factors, such as the political realignment of former
trading partners. Thus, where a change or imminent change of
government is viewed as detrimental to United States security,
goods or technology that could have been shipped under a QGL,
almost overnight would require a validated license. The QGL
gives the appearance of expedited procedure, 0 but the burdens on
the exporter may remain as heavy in a given situation as under the
1969 Act.
This view is consistent with section 2404 (f) which permits the
Secretary, pursuant to regulations, to determine that where a partic-
ular item is available in comparable quantity and quality to con-
trolled countries, a validated license is unnecessary,"' for in that
situation as well a validated license may still be required by the
President should he determine that use of a QGL would prove det-
rimental to national security.
8 2
3. Licensing Procedures. Section 2409 of the Act sets forth
the mechanics for obtaining an export license. Briefly, this provi-
sion establishes a timetable for review of license applications and
the information that must be supplied to and by the applicant in the
review process.8 3
a. Timetable. The Secretary has ten days from the receipt of
an application for initial screening to determine if the application
has been properly completed, if it must be forwarded to another
department or agency for review, or whether it must be forwarded
78. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2404(e)(1).
79. Id. § 2404(e)(3).
80. Id. § 2404(e)(1).
81. Id. § 2404(f).
82. Id.
83. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2409(a).
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to any multilateral review procedure to which the United States is a
party, which usually means to the "Coordinating Committee"
(COCOM).8 4  COCOM is an informal voluntary international
body, established for the mutual security of member states and con-
sists of Japan and NATO members except Iceland. 5 The Secre-
tary, upon review, must inform the applicant of his decisions.8 6
Unless referred and if the application is properly completed, the
license must thereafter be issued or denied within ninety days.87
If the application is forwarded to another government depart-
ment or agency, they have thirty days (with provision for a thirty-
day extension) to review and forward its observations and recom-
mendations to the Commerce Department." The Secretary then
has ninety days after receipt of the referred agency's views to issue
or deny the license,89 unless the application is then referred to
COCOM.90
Applicants are informed of any agency objections and are
given an opportunity to respond to the referred agency's views
before the Secretary can render a decision, to the extent that such
procedure is consistent with United States national security and
foreign policy.91 If the application is denied, the Secretary must
give reasons, if national security and foreign policy so permit, and
84. Id. § 2409(b).
85. COCOM has two basic functions: to maintain a list of strategic goods and technolo-
gies which may be embargoed or monitored and to secure agreement on measures designed
to prevent re-export of controlled items and thereby limit the build-up of the military poten-
tial of communist countries. Skol, supra note 63, at 40. Embargoed items fall into three
principal categories: those used in arms production; those used in military technology; and,
those with military significance intended for areas in short supply. Examination supra note 2,
at 185. COCOM was established in 1950 through U.S. legislative proposals aimed at termi-
nating trade with countries that engaged in unregulated commerce with the Soviet bloc. Id.
at 41. The COCOM participants each have different attitudes toward the items proposed for
control. As a consequence of this disagreement, COCOM activity tends to be coordinated
around the "lowest common denominator," which means also that the list of U.S. controlled
items is more comprehensive than the COCOM list. McQuade, supra note 62, at 72-73.
COCOM success has traditionally been linked to the attitudes of COCOM members toward
U.S. participation. Tension between COCOM members and the U.S. has been generated
over the desire of COCOM members to make U.S. national security interests secondary to
their own trade interests. Examination, upra note 2, at 197.
86. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2409(b).
87. Id. § 2409(c).
88. Id. § 2409(d) and (e).
89. Id. § 2409(0. If referred agencies give conflicting recommendations, the Secretary
must within the ninety-day period prescribed in section 2409(0, resolve the conflict. Id.
90. Id. § 2409(b)(5).
91. Id. § 2409(0(2).
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inform the applicant of appeal procedures. 92 Normally an appli-
cant who is denied a license or whose application is not acted upon
within required time periods may appeal to the Secretary.93
If the processing of an application does not conform to the re-
quirement of section 2409(j)(2), or if the processing does conform
but the Secretary fails to notify the applicant, injunctive or other
appropriate relief is available in the Federal District Court.94 Fi-
nally, any time period prescribed in section 2409 can be extended,
upon notice to Congress and the applicant, if the Secretary deter-
mines that the importance and complexity of an application re-
quires additional time for negotiations to modify it.95
b. TechnicalAdvisory Committee. The EAA of 1979 reenacts
another important innovation of its predecessor by providing for
the creation of technical advisory committees. 96 The 1979 Act pro-
vides that if a substantial number of representatives of an industry
learn that their goods or technology are subject to export controls
for national security reasons, the Secretary, upon being requested
by them in writing, will appoint such a committee with respect to
any goods or technology that are difficult to evaluate due to techni-
cal questions, availability, use of protection and technology, or li-
censing procedures.97 The committee will be composed of
members of the federal government and industry.98 The purpose of
these committees is to aid the Secretary in implementing the poli-
cies of the Act,99 and to provide information in the areas described
above.00
The key factor in determining whether to establish a technical
advisory committee appears to be that the export item is "difficult
to evaluate."'' This is a somewhat easily satisfied criterion be-
92. Id. § 2409(0(3).
93. Id. § 2409(j)(1), (2).
94. Id. § 2409j)(3).
95. Id. § 2409(0(4).
96. Id. § 2404(h); cf. EAA of 1969, supra note 3, § 2404(c).
97. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2404(h)(1).
98. Id.
99. Id. § 2404(h)(2). The Secretary is required to consult with committees having such
expertise on technical questions, world-wide availability and utilization of production tech-
nology, the effect of licensing procedures on the level of export controls, and exports subject
to multilateral controls in which the United States participates. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. § 2404(h)(1).
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cause it presents few obstacles to Commerce Department action
and invites extensive private sector participation.
c. Obstaclesfor the Exporter. Despite Congress' intention to
place greater emphasis on a trade expansion policy under the new
Act, 0 2 the licensing procedures do not readily facilitate that pur-
pose. One difficulty that an applicant may encounter is the double
licensing requirement resulting from the COCOM referral. The
applicant must obtain a license from COCOM if a product
originating in the United States is shipped to a COCOM country
for re-export from that point to a controlled country. 0 3 Approval
of the application by the Commerce Department is subject to
COCOM approval."°  The approval of the application by
COCOM, however, is not subject to the Commerce Department's
approval. This is so because the list of COCOM-controlled items is
shorter than the United States control list. That difference reflects
COCOM's frequent lack of unanimity respecting items that United
States security agencies believe merit control. 10 5 The applicant
may, therefore, find his way successfully through the initial Com-
merce Department screening, the special Defense Department pro-
cedures under section 2409(g), and through the COCOM process,
only to be denied in the final stage of the United States determina-
tion for national security reasons. This procedure is unique among
COCOM nations since the United States is the only member that
requires two licenses: one for export to a COCOM country and
another for re-export from a COCOM country. °6
The decision by Congress not to adopt a single license require-
ment, like that of its COCOM partners, reflects continued (and per-
haps unnecessary) concern over strategic items. In pursuit of that
goal, Congress has failed to enact a licensing procedure that elimi-
nates undue delay for exporters who are subject to multilateral con-
trols or to provide for speedy review of a COCOM partner's
exception requests which are also subject to mutilateral controls.1
0 7
102. See notes 53-63 supra and accompanying text.
103. See Sen. Rep., supra note 11, at 2473. For a comparison with licensing procedures
under the EAA of 1969, supra note 3, see Export Licensing, supra note 8, at 347-50.
104. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 2473. A COCOM member also may petition mem-
ber states to exempt a domestic exporter from multilateral restrictions for one-time sales.
Examination, supra note 2, at 190.
105. See EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2409(h).
106. See McQuade, supra note 62, at 92. COCOM's effectiveness also is weakened by
the fact that it is an entirely voluntary organization with no power to enforce its decisions on
member nations. Reconciliation, supra note 2, at 445.
107. See Senate Report, supra note 11, at 2473.
Vol. 12
24
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1 [], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol12/iss1/2
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979
In this situation, the licensing process shows no improvement, from
the exporter's point of view, over the procedure of the EAA of 1969.
A United States company may, as a result, feel compelled to cir-
cumvent United States procedures by applying for an export license
through a foreign subsidiary where the country of residence is more
receptive to export license applications than is the United States. 1
0 8
It is also detrimental to United States trade since it compels foreign
firms to find substitutes for United States components delayed by
licensing procedures. ,09
Another potential obstacle for the exporter is the requirement
that the Secretary consider agency views in granting or denying a
license application. The extent of this duty goes no further than
requiring the Secretary to take those views into account.' l0 Pre-
sumably the Secretary need only declare that the agency's views
were considered. Even if the agency presents overwhelming evi-
dence against imposing an export control, the Secretary is not
bound by that conclusion. Thus, there may be the burden of addi-
tional delay for the exporter without a corresponding duty on the
Commerce Department to consider the agency's views.
One reason for the Secretary's broad discretion is that the Act
does not specify how much weight, if any, must be accorded to
agency input, and therefore does not significantly reduce that dis-
cretion. The absence of such an evidentiary standard also prevents
federal agencies from indirectly creating foreign policy. Moreover,
section 2409 (f) apparently does not require the Secretary to state
reasons for accepting or rejecting agency recommendations.
A related difficulty is the conditional requirement that the Sec-
retary inform the applicant of the reasons for a negative agency
determination' I I or of the reasons for denial of his application." 12
The exporter is entitled to an explanation in these situations unless,
in the Secretary's judgment, this would prove to be inconsistent
with foreign policy or national security interests. The Secretary's
discretion in that matter is so broad as to virtually preclude review-
ability, provided that his discretion is not abused or arbitrarily ap-
plied. 113
108. Examination, supra note 2, at 198-99.
109. See Hoya, supra note 2, at 9.
110. EAA of 1979, upra note 10 § 2409(f). See Examination supra note 2, at 192.
111. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2409(f)(2).
112. Id. § 2409(0(3).
113. See K. DAVIS, supra note 21, at 514-18.
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Under section 2409(g) the applicant who survives the ordinary
rigors of the section 2409(f) licensing procedures must also satisfy
the provisions of the Act for special procedures available to the
Secretary of Defense. This provision authorizes the Secretary of
Defense to review any item proposed for export to a controlled
country, independent of a referral by the Commerce Department.
The Secretary of Defense must then recommend to the President
that it be disapproved where it is determined that exportation will
significantly contribute to the military potential of a country op-
posed to United States national security.' 14 Moreover, pursuant to
consultation with the Secretary of Defense as to categories of items
that the Secretary should review for national security purposes, the
Secretary of Commerce must give notice of license requests for ex-
ports of goods and technology to controlled countries to the De-
fense Department. Only then can the Commerce Department issue
a license pending approval by the President within the alloted pe-
riod of time." 5 The President has thirty days thereafter to accept,
reject, or modify the recommendation of the Defense Department
to disapprove the license, whereupon none will be issued.' " 6
Section 2409(g) thereby effectively imposes another procedural
hurdle for the applicant seeking to export goods or technology to a
controlled country, which is likely to be communist. This section
also appears to relieve the President of the duty to state reasons for
disapproval, and thus, does not provide a right of appeal. More-
over, it is silent as to what constitutes a significant contribution to
the military potential of an adversary and does not specify what is
meant by national security or how a threat to it is to be determined.
However, as the President is not required to state reasons for disap-
proving an application and as no right of appeal exists, it may be
presumed that these terms are susceptible of broad interpretation.
Thus, except for the determination that the export item will make a
significant contribution to the military potential of a controlled
country to the detriment of national security, section 2409(g) vests
broad discretion in the Secretary of Defense once categories of con-
114. Id. § 2409(9)(1).
115. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2409(g)(a).
116. The Secretary of Defense has thirty days after being informed of the request to
recommend that the President disapprove. Id. § 2409(g)(2)(A). Within this time the Secre-
tary of Defense may also decide to notify Commerce that he approves of the request subject
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trolled items are agreed on with the Secretary of Commerce." 17
The Defense Department's power to review any proposed ex-
port within a predetermined category independently of referral by
Commerce could mean that the entire section 2409 procedure can
be "short-circuited." As a consequence, a license applicant would
have no opportunity to respond to agency views. The reasons for
denial of the application need not be given, and the applicant
would have no right of appeal. The President is allowed to deny a
license application based on a minimal determination of need, but
he is not required to make a corresponding showing of the effective-
ness of the control. Thus, as to certain categories of goods and
technology, section 2409(g) places an almost preemptive power in
the hands of the Defense Department."' This power reflects a
strong Congressional preference for leaving national security inter-
ests in the firm grip of the Executive, a grip not yet to be loosened
by the interests of exporters.
d Gainsfor the Exporter. The foreign availability provisions
may nevertheless represent some gains for exporters. First, the role
of the government in licensing procedures is more clearly drawn.' '1
Second, the Office of Export Administration of the Commerce De-
partment is solely authorized to monitor foreign availability, which
makes for greater efficiency and consistency. 2' Third, the Secre-
tary may for the first time establish procedures and guidelines to
determine foreign availability. 2 ' On balance, however, the unwill-
ingness of Congress to shackle the Executive in national security
matters makes the question of substantial gains by exporters prob-
lematic because of the broad grant of authority given to the Execu-
tive. In addition, the broad discretion, the seemingly deliberate
vagueness of terms and the lack of guidelines may not only lead to
unpredictability for both exporters and trading partners, but may
also result in inconsistencies in foreign policy. Ultimately the Act
and those who apply it may do a disservice to the private as well as
to the public sectors. That potential disservice is compounded by
the detrimental economic impact that denial of a license applica-
tion may have. This procedure may also dissuade exporters from
117. Id. § 2409(g)(1).
118. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2409(g).
119. Id. § 2404(f).
120. § 2404(0(5).
121. Id. § 2404(f)(1).
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seeking trade with socialist or less developed countries deemed po-
tentially hostile to the United States interests.
C Export Controls
1. Mechanismsfor Implementing National Security Controls.
Congress has recognized throughout the history of export control
legislation that the success of United States export controls for na-
tional security purposes depends on the unrestricted foreign availa-
bility of goods and technology comparable in quantity and quality
to those produced in the United States.' 2
a. Congressional Controls. Section 2404 of the Act authorizes
the President to prohibit or curtail the export of any goods or tech-
nology in the interest of national security.'23 The new Act contin-
ues the approach of its 1969 predecessor 24 by providing that export
policy with respect to granting validated licenses to controlled
countries will regard that country's communist or non-communist
status as only one factor.'25 Other factors that must be considered
include: (1) a country's present and potential relationship with the
United States, (2) its present and potential relationship with coun-
tries friendly or hostile to the United States and (3) its ability to
control re-export of United States goods and technology consistent
with United States foreign policy.
26
The fact that the EAA of 1979 substantially re-enacted the
same criteria that were considered under the amendments to the
old Act suggests that Congress was satisfied with this approach and
that it intended the derivative benefits of this statutory framework
to accrue unabated for the exporting community. This policy of
freer trade with all countries is an instance in which ideological and
political differences are deemed compatible with mutual economic
benefit between countries having different economic structures '
27
122. Examination, supra note 2, at 185-86, 194-95.
123. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2404(a)(1).
124. See EAA of 1969, supra note 3, § 2403(a)(2)(A) and (B). See also Export Licensing,
supra note 8, at 340-41, where the author notes that the 1977 Amendments to the EAA
sought to limit the President's discretion in the area of national security export controls by
requiring him to consider the same factors now embodied in section 2404 of the 1979 Act.
125. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2404(o).
126. Id.
127. With respect to "retransfers" or re-exports of U.S. exports, one commentator terms
the control over re-export as an "anti-diversionary" requirement, which is imposed by both
the general and validated licenses. By means of this requirement, an item may not first be
shipped to a permissable destination and then transshipped to an impermissable one without
Vol. 12
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b. Executive Controls. Subsections (b), (c) and (f) of section
2403 impose affirmative obligations on the Executive in establish-
ing export controls. Subsection (b) requires the Secretary to main-
tain a Commodity Control List which includes all goods and
technology governed by export controls under the Act. 28 Subsec-
tion (c) concerns the foreign availability of export items. 29 Consis-
tent with section 2404(f), it requires the President to refrain from
imposing export controls for foreign policy or national security pur-
poses if he determines that there exist no restrictions on an item of
comparable quality and quantity from foreign sources.130  If he de-
termines through "adequate evidence" that the absence of such
control would prove detrimental to United States foreign policy or
national security interests, he may impose controls.'
3'
The "adequate evidence" test, although not defined in the Act,
appears to be a rather undemanding evidentiary standard and
seems comparable to the "substantial evidence" test adopted by the
courts for review of other types of administrative decisions. 132 It is,
U.S. approval. McQuade, supra note 62, at 78. As a result, it is difficult to negotiate the
commercial documents, such as letters of credit, used in the transaction, even though this
type of control may be ineffective. Id. Moreover, friendly countries may complain of these
controls as having extraterritorial effect. Id. at 79. Cf. EAA of 1979, supra note 10,
§ 2404(1), which imposes export controls when "reliable evidence" is presented that goods or
technology subject to controls have been converted to military use following export to a
country under national security controls. In such cases and despite issuance of a validated
license, the Secretary is directed to deny all further exports to the responsible party regardless
of foreign availability and to take such additional steps against the responsible country as
will deter further use of such products. In testimony before the Senate Committee which
considered the 1979 Act, former Secretary of State Rusk reaffirmed this policy:
We should be reminding ourselves that trade occurs when it is of benefit to
both parties. . . During the postwar decades when we were in a very strong trade
position, many of us tended to think of trade as a "favor" which we were doing for
someone else. That attitude is a luxury which we may not be able to afford with
our present large trade deficit.
Senate Report, supra note 11, at 2469. One commentator points out that the low volume of
trade between the United States and communist countries relative to Western Europe can be
traced to United States legal restrictions. Hoya, supra note 2, at 4, 8. In view of the congres-
sional policy to expand trade with communist nations and of the most favored nation status
for tariff treatment granted to the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of
Romania, it makes no sense to continue denial of MFN status to the Soviet Union. See also
Metzger, supra note 9, at 1017-18; Comment, An Interim Analysis of the Effects of the Jack-
son- Vanilc Amendment on Trade and Human Rights." The Romanian Example, 8 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 193 (1976); Pavelic, Exporting to the People's Republic of China, II CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 337 (1979).
128. EAA of 1979, supa note 10, § 2403(b).
129. Id. § 2403(c).
130. Id. § 2404(f).
131. Id. § 2403(c).
132. The Senate Report reads this provision as requiring the President to assess foreign
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therefore, probably a less exacting requirement than the preponder-
ance test. Accordingly, the burden of justifying an export control
despite foreign availability may not be very difficult to meet. This
minimal restraint on presidential authority reflects congressional
deference in foreign policy and national security matters even
though it could mean giving a competitive advantage to foreign ex-
porters. The standard further reflects the unwillingness of Congress
to tie the President's hands by a more difficult requirement, thereby
sacrificing his ability to respond quickly and flexibly to changing
circumstances abroad.
Subsection (f) of section 2403 imposes a public notice require-
ment on the Secretary concerning changes in export control policy
and procedures for the purpose of encouraging trade.13 3 Moreover,
subsection (f) requires that the Secretary "shall meet regularly"
with the business community to review export control policy and
foreign availability. I3 4 This subsection is silent as to the conse-
quences of the Secretary's failure to meet with or of his disregard-
ing the views of business people. However, in the light of the
congressional policy that export controls be administered "consis-
availability and, where it exists in a comparable manner, to present "adequate evidence" that
export controls are still necessary for foreign policy and national security purposes. Senate
Report, supra note 11, at 2471. The Report does not define the evidentiary standard, nor
does it designate who determines its adequacy. The Supreme Court has indeed equated the
"substantial evidence" test with the concept of adequate evidence. The Court has stated that
this standard "means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. . . . [This] does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in
evidence having rational probative force." (Emphasis added). Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). The "substantial evidence" test also has been held to be a lesser
standard than the weight or preponderance test, and the fact that inconsistent conclusions are
supportable in the record does not mean that an agency's findings lacks adequate evidentiary
support. NLRB v. Colombian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939). One com-
mentator has defined the "substantial evidence" test as such that the agency's determination
will be "supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole." E. GELL-
HORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 265 (1972). Thus, the "substantial evidence"
and "adequate evidence" tests are essentially tests requiring a rational basis for an agency
decision. See also United States v. U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. 364 (1947); Warner-Lambert Co.
v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The substantial evidence test and presumably the
adequate evidence test as well would preclude reversal on review unless the evidence pro-
vides no reasonable basis for the agency's conclusion, and while variations in the results
reached by appellate courts can be expected, both substantial evidence and adequate evi-
dence would appear to bar a reviewing court from substituting its own judgment on the facts.
See generaly 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 255-262 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as 3 DAVIS, TREATISE]. The "substantial evidence" test was adopted in the Administrative
Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, § 10(e), 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(E). No similar evidentiary standard
was adopted under the EAA of 1969.
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tent with basic standards of due process,"' 35 a claim in the nature of
a due process violation of a statutory right could be inferred should
the Secretary fail to hold regular meetings. Depending on the
meaning ascribed to "regularly", the courts may be more willing to
recognize a claim under subsection (f), as doing so would have no
direct impact on the Executive's ability to impose export con-
trols. 36 Finally, the President is required to review United States
export policy not less than every three years with respect to controls
maintained cooperatively with other countries, and annually as to
other controls, to determine the continuing efficacy of United States
policy toward individual countries.
c. Private Exporter Views. Another positive aspect of the
statutory scheme governing national security controls is the voice
given to private parties potentially affected by such controls.
137
Once the Departments of Commerce and Defense have established
the commodity control list as to the export of items to controlled
countries for national security purposes,'38 the 1979 Act requires
that prior to issuing regulations concerning review of export con-
trols on the commodities list, the Secretary must consult with mem-
135. Id., § 2402(10).
136. Cf. EAA of 1969, supra note 3, § 2403(2) which provides that the Secretary must
apprise the business community "with a view to encouraging the widest possible trade."
In a variety of contexts the Supreme Court has recognized that due process requires at
least an informal adjudication, consisting of notice of the claimed violation to the affected
individual, an opportunity to respond to the charges, and a pre-decision hearing. See, e.g.,
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (due process requires that student be apprised of evidence
against him and be allowed to respond before suspension from school); Board of Curators of
the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (informal academic dismissal
procedure where medical student had notice of dismissal and reasons for it and opportunity
to talk to appropriate officials was consistent with due process); Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (terminating service for nonpayment of bill
without first providing opportunity to present complaint of being overcharged violated cus-
tomer's due process rights); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (right to probable cause
hearing and later final hearing prior to decision to revoke parole); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778 (1973) (right to probable cause hearing and hearing before final decision prior to
revocation of probation); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (right to written notice of
claimed violations and statement of factual basis and opportunity to respond required prior
to prisoner's loss of good time); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits
could not be suspended pending outcome of termination hearing). See generally 2 K. Davis,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 473-522 (2d ed. 1979).
. 137. Cf. EAA of 1969, supra note 3, § 2404, which provides that the President in his
discretion can seek advice from private industry to the extent this is consistent with national
security.
138. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2404(c)(1), (2).
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bers of the exporting community who may be affected. 39  This
requirement applies only to goods and technology and not to mili-
tarily critical technologies. 40 Also, permitting parties "potentially
affected" to submit their views considerably widens the range of
technical, industrial and market information available to the Com-
merce Department. Moreover, the receipt of such information is
not limited by national security interests.' 4 ' Assimilation of a great
deal of information may cause delay in processing license applica-
tions, but the final decisions will presumably lead to fairer and
more reasonable decisions with respect to the private sector than
might result without such input. That is due to the expertise of
industry officials willing to share technical evaluations on the
worldwide state of the arts in high technology areas. 42 The cor-
rectness of the Secretary's decision is by no means assured, since
the views of industry are not binding on him. Section 2404(c) fails
to specify what weight, if any, should be given to private sector
opinions, nor does it require the Secretary to state reasons for re-
jecting industry views. Presumably, therefore, industry data could
be accorded minimal significance, or it could even be totally disre-
garded. 1
43
d Validated License. Another mechanism for implementing
national security controls is by means of the validated license. Ex-
porters are required to obtain this type of license only if. (1) their
product is restricted under a multilateral agreement to which the
United States is a party (i.e., COCOM), and under such agreement,
approval of the participating states is required, (2) other nations
have not developed the goods or technology to a greater extent than
the United States (foreign availability), and (3) the United States
seeks to control such goods or technology by securing similar con-
139. Id. § 2404(c)(3).
140. Id. § 2404(c)(1), (2).
141. Controls on militarily critical technologies are governed by § 2404(d) and do not
permit input from private industry for such determinations.
142. Section 2404(c)(3) also requires that as part of the review prior to issuing regula-
tions, an assessment of foreign availability of listed items be made.
143. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2404(c). One commentator points out that there are
limitations on the utility of government consultation with industry. For example, national
security interests may prevent industry advisers from obtaining all the information necessary
to make the best assessment possible. McQuade, supra note 62, at 96. Moreover, because of
the confidentiality requirements of the Act, the government may be prohibited from disclos-
ing information from license applicants to private consultants. EAA of 1979, supra note 10,
§ 2411 (c). It is also an undesirable policy to reveal confidential information from applicants.
McQuade, supra note 62, at 96.
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trols from other suppliers, and the Secretary deems a validated li-
cense to be necessary pending conclusion of such multilateral
agreement.'"
A significant feature of the validated license provision is the
foreign availability requirement. Under the 1979 Act, the Secretary
is barred from requiring a validated license if foreign availability
exists in fact, that is if other nations possess comparable capabilities
to export goods or technology potentially subject to validated li-
cense requirements. 45 If the President determines that the lack of
control would be detrimental to national security, he may require a
validated license despite foreign availability.'" The President is
not required to balance national security against the detriment to
exporters due to foreign availability nor even to define in specific
terms the national security interest affected. Absent the Presiden-
tial determination, the Secretary must grant the application for a
validated license where foreign availability exists. 14 7 Thus, Con-
gress again expressed its determination that national security shall
predominate over private economic interests even though the vali-
dated license would be ineffective and requiring it would result in a
competitive advantage to foreign producers. Henceforth, Congress
entrusts wide discretion to the Executive in the granting of such
licenses, for the President is authorized to determine what national
security interest is sufficient to require a validated license. 48 Even
though such a finding could be refuted by evidence of a foreign
availability showing that national security objectives are not ad-
vanced by the President's actions, it would appear that Congress is
being overly cautious and overly protective of national security, as
the President need make little more than a cursory finding of a
threat to national security. Congress has apparently given in to ide-
ology over practicability on this point because ultimately economic
interests are ill-served.
2. Foreign Policy Controls. Section 2405 of the Act sets forth
six somewhat overlapping criteria that the President must consider
before imposing export controls on goods, technology or informa-
tion for reasons of foreign policy. These factors include: (1) the
144. See notes 69-73 supra, and accompanying text.
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probability that such controls will be effective, such as control of
foreign availability;149 (2) the compatibility with foreign policy
objectives, such as control of terrorism and the implementation of
United States policy toward controlled countries; (3) the reaction
of other countries to the imposition or expansion of such controls;
(4) the effect on exports, employment, production and the reputa-
tion of the United States as a world supplier; (5) the ability of the
United States to enforce such controls; and (6) the foreign policy
consequences of not imposing such controls. 150
The Act does not expressly require the President to demon-
strate that he has met these criteria. Instead, as the Senate Commit-
tee noted, he must only consider those factors. In addition no
statutory guidance as to the priority or relative weight to be ac-
corded to each factor exists. Thus, provided the President shows
that they entered into the decision-making process, he would be
free to balance these considerations in any order and attach
whatever significance he deems appropriate. Section 2405 could
reasonably be read as providing that the President may be found to
be in violation of the 1979 Act if he ignores these criteria altogether,
but this section does not seem to imply that the President must rest
his decision solely on these six factors. However, they are worded
so broadly that almost any determination could seemingly be based
on one or more considerations.
It is also noteworthy that the President must consider among
these six criteria the potential impact of his decision on the private
sector and domestic economy.151 The possibility of adverse domes-
tic effects need not, however, decisively influence the President's
decision to impose export controls. He is clearly entitled, based on
the wording of the Act' 52 to disregard this factor if, in his discre-
149. One commentator states that foreign availability, which is generally understood to
mean what can and cannot be exported to communist countries, is an essential consideration
in a licensing decision but that the test for determining its existence is difficult to apply. The
first problem is with interpretation of the term, and the second relates to collecting sufficient
reliable information with which to make an accurate assessment. Finally, problems arise
with respect to the requirement of validated licenses from the Department of Commerce for
technology and/or component parts whose origin causes concern. McQuade, supra note 62,
at 88-90. The author concludes that "[t]here is no litmus paper test" to resolve a problem of
this complexity. Id. at 91.
150. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2405(b).
151. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 2470.
152. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2405(b)(4).
Section 2405(b) provides in relevant part:
When imposing, expanding, or extending export controls under this section,
the President shall consider-
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tion, he finds that foreign policy interests predominate. In short,
the President must consider all of the factors enumerated in section
2405. Failure to do so could give rise to violation of the 1979 Act
on the part of the President for abuse of discretion. He need not,
however, regard any of those factors as decisive or even persuasive
to his determination to impose export controls, and even if he were
to be found in violation, the remedy might only be an order di-
recting him to show that the six factors cited in section 2405 were
considered. His response to such order could be perfunctory.
3. Short Supply Controls. Section 2406 of the Act establishes
the authority and procedure which Congress considered necessary
to alleviate shortages in domestic supplies. This section also gov-
erns such matters as the export of crude oil and petroleum products
and agricultural commodities.
In order to prevent "excessive drain" of domestic goods and to
reduce inflation caused by foreign demand, 5 3 section 2406 autho-
rizes the President to impose export controls.5 4 The President does
this by allocating a percentage of export licenses based on a deter-
mination of the equitable trade treatment given the United States
by other countries and by their treatment of the United States in
periods of short supply.' This provision also invites comment
from "all interested parties"'' 56 regarding the impact of quantitative
restrictions and licensing methods.
a. Monitoring Recyclable Metallic Materials. Section 2406
also provides a limited alternative to licensing through a system of
monitoring recyclable metallic materials in short supply.15 7 To so-
licit the views of the private sector in this situation is reasonable
since its members are likely to have specialized information that
could assist the government. Consideration of private views is con-
sistent with the application procedures for validated and qualified
general licenses. 158
(4) the likely effects of the proposed controls on ...individual United States
companies and their employees and communities, including the effects of the
controls on existing contracts;...
153. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2402(2)(C).
154. Id. § 2406(a)(1).
155. Id.
156. Id. § 2406(a)(2).
157. Id. § 2406(c)(1).
158. The House version of this provision would have granted the right of petition to the
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Any representative of an industrial entity engaged in process-
ing recyclable metallic materials with respect to which there has
been an increased domestic price or shortage as a result of in-
creased exports may activate the monitoring process by petitioning
the Commerce Department for monitoring or export controls or
both."'59 The Secretary then initiates notice and comment proceed-
ings giving interested parties thirty days to respond. If the petition-
ing party requests a public hearing, one must be conducted.'60 The
Secretary has forty-five days after this proceeding terminates to de-
cide whether to impose monitoring, licensing or both. 6 ' He also
must publish proposed regulations within fifteen days and wait an-
other thirty days for public comment before implementing his deci-
sion through the regulations.
62
The Secretary is also authorized to impose temporary monitor-
ing or controls following a petition but before making a final deci-
sion. This is done if he deems such action necessary to stem the
flow of scarce resources and reduce the inflationary impact of for-
eign demand.' 63 The meaning of "temporary" is not defined, but
regardless of what it means, it raises a question of the difficulty of
lifting temporary controls once the machinery to impose them is in
place. There is doubt that such controls would be readily removed
because section 2406(c) does not provide a test for evaluating either
the relative merits of the petitioner's request to impose monitoring
or the responses of the opposing parties. The absence of such
guidelines invites the Secretary to arbitrarily maintain the tempo-
rary monitoring or control imposed following a petition and may
place an unreasonably high burden of proof on the responding
party to get them lifted. Thus, section 2406(c) may fufiU its in-
Commerce Department for any material or commodity subject to export controls. House
Conference Report No. 96-482, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2496, 2508 [hereinafter cited as House Report]. See also EAA of 1979, supra note
10, § 2406(g) for the procedures to control short supplies of agricultural commodities. Signif-
icantly, this section requires approval by the Secretary of Agriculture for any action taken
thereunder with respect to any agricultural commodity, except where the President deter-
mines that action must be taken to carry out national security and foreign policy objectives
under § 2402(2)(A) or (B). The views of the private sector are not invited. Cf. § 2402(11)
which states that one goal of the 1979 Act is to minimize export controls on agricultural
goods. See generally Comment, Promoting Agricultural Exports.- The Agricultural Trade Act
of1978, 5 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. Reg. 263 (1980).
159. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2406(c).
160. Id. § 2406(c)(2).
161. Id. § 2406(c)(3).
162. Id. § 2406(c)(4).
163. Id. § 2406(c)(8).
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tended purpose of temporary monitoring or controls, but it may
have the unintended secondary effect of discouraging foreign com-
merce in the recyclable metals industry.
The Senate Report expressed concern over the issue of "panic
ordering" of the item in question once a petition is made."6 The
Committee acknowledged this potential problem but believed that
it would be resolved once the industry grew accustomed to the new
procedure and that it would not automatically result in monitoring
or controls.16 The Committee's response, however, seems rather
sanguine in the light of the potential difficulties of temporary moni-
toring discussed above. It can also be argued that once an industry
representative petitions for monitoring, there must be a serious
problem that may not be adequately answered within the statutory
time constraints or else the petitioner would not have sought gov-
ernment intervention. Thus, the Committee may have dismissed
the question with too facile an answer.
b. Monitoring Domestically-Produced Crude Oil. Another
provision of section 2406 that is certain to restrict the exporting
ability of many private parties is the prohibition on the exportation
of domestically-produced crude oil. 166 The legislative history
makes clear that this restriction is directed against the export of oil
produced from the Alaskan North Slope (ANS). 16 7 The 1979 Act
prohibits the export of domestically-produced crude oil transported
over the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline, unless it is exported to an adja-
cent country for refinement and consumption there, in exchange for
an equal quantity of oil from the recipient country. 68 The ex-
change must also lower oil prices in the United States or be tempo-
rarily exported across an adjacent foreign country for reasons of
convenience and efficiency of transportation.
69
Domestic crude oil cannot be exported, except if the President
expressly determines that such export would: (1) not diminish the
quantity or quality of United States crude; (2) result in lower ac-
quisition costs to United States refineries within three months fol-
lowing initiation of the exchange and result in a savings of seventy-
five per cent or more, as reflected in lower wholesale and retail
164. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 2474-75.
165. Id.
166. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, at § 2406(d).
167. See, e.g., Senate Report, supra note 11, at 2476-77, 2493-96.
168. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2406(d)(1).
169. Id.
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prices; (3) be made pursuant to contracts terminable if United
States crude oil supplies are threatened, interrupted or diminished;
(4) be consistent with national interest; and (5) be in accordance
with other provisions of the Act. 7 ° Following those determina-
tions, Congress has sixty days in which to approve the President's
findings by concurrent resolution.
17
This provision was attacked by a number of Senators who ar-
gued that its effect would be to inhibit the development of domestic
crude oil resources at a time when foreign supplies were uncertain
and fuel prices at home were steadily increasing. 172 Prohibiting
crude oil exports, they believed, would discourage the efforts of the
private sector by foreclosing access to foreign markets and have a
negative impact on the economy. To those objections, the Commit-
tee responded simply that ANS production would increase into
1980; however no evidence of that effect was offered. 17 3 The Com-
mittee also urged completion of pipelines and refineries on the
West Coast as the means to stimulate ANS development, but it ad-
mitted that little action had been taken. 
174
Both sides to that debate engaged in a degree of speculation,
and only the passage of time will prove which, if either, was correct.
In the meantime, section 2406 creates serious difficulties for crude
oil producers who must pay higher transportation costs to ship their
product to the more distant domestic markets of the Midwest .
75
The prospects for export are somewhat remote due to the difficult
"express findings" that the President must make under section 2406
before exportation can occur. The wording of section 2406 suggests
that he must at least present clear and convincing evidence of all
five factors. 17 6 The prohibition on the export of domestically-pro-
duced crude oil is, therefore, an exception to the general policy of
encouraging free trade. This prohibition however, seems to lack a
persuasive rationale.
4. Foreign Boycotts. The area of unsanctioned international
boycotts, governed by section 2407, reflects an obvious congres-
sional preference strongly favoring foreign policy over the interests
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 2493-96.
173. Id. at 2476-77.
174. Id. at 2494-95.
175. Id. at 2476.
176. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2406(d)(2)(A).
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of exporters. Section 2407 empowers the President to issue regula-
tions prohibiting any person within the United States who engages
in domestic or foreign commerce from participating in foreign boy-
cotts imposed against a country friendly to the United States and
which is itself not the object of a boycott.
177
Section 2407 requires that any United States person ap-
proached to participate in a foreign boycott, regardless of whether
or not he intends to comply, must report those facts to the Secretary
of Commerce.' 7  The anti-boycott provisions were retained intact
from the EAA of 1969179 and clearly represent a policy that Con-
gress is determined to enforce.180 This is evidenced by the affirma-
tive duties imposed on individuals with no apparent recognition of
the economic harship they may suffer at the hands of the boycotting
country for failing to comply with that country's demands. In
summary, the anti-boycott provisions of section 2407 prohibit
United States persons from taking part or complying with the sec-
ondary or tertiary aspects of unsanctioned international boycotts,
but they permit compliance with the primary boycott. 18 1 The
prohibitions and duties of section 2407 are stated with sufficient
conciseness and consistency to enable businesses to predict admin-
istrative enforcement. However, the EAA of 1979 is but one of sev-
177. Id. § 2407(a)(1). For other statutes which contain anti-boycott provisions, see the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 1061-1064, 1066, 1067, 90 Stat. 1525 (adding
I.R.C. §§ 908, 999), modifying I.R.C. §§ 952, 955; Sherman Act Section 1, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8
(1976). See also Note, Through the Antiboycoti Morass to an Export Priority, 9 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 357 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Antiboycot Morass]. The following are also
prohibited acts under § 2407:
1. Refusal to do business with any boycotted country or with any business orga-
nized under the laws of that country pursuant to a request or agreement with
the boycotting country;
2. Refusal to employ or use of any other form of discrimination against any U.S.
person on the basis of race, religion, sex or national origin or against his/her
supervisor or employer;
3. Furnishing information with respect to race, religion, sex or national origin of
any U.S. person or his/her supervisor or employer;
4. Furnishing information regarding the business relationship of any person with
a boycotted country or with business concern organized under the laws of that
country or with any national or resident of the boycotted country;
5. Furnishing information about the membership of any person or involvement in
activities supporting a boycotted country; and,
6. Implementing letters of credit which contain conditions or requirements to
comply in any manner which violates the regulations issued under this section.
178. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2407(b)(2).
179. EAA of 1969, as amended, supra note 3, § 2403-1a.
180. See Senate Report, supra note 11, at 2479. For a discussion of the conflicting inter-
pretations of the antiboycott provisions under 1977 amendments to the EAA, see "An-
tiboycott Morass," supra note 177, at 358-60.
181. See "Antiboycott Morass," supra note 177, at 358.
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eral laws with which they must contend.'82
5. Proceduresfor Hardship Relief. Under section 2408 hard-
ship relief from export controls is available to any person who uses
a product produced abroad from a good historically obtained from
the United States but which is subjected to an export control. 83 It
is also available to any person who historically has exported such a
good.184 Persons affected in either manner may petition the Secre-
tary for exemption from the control because of the "unique hard-
ship" it imposes on them. Petitions must demonstrate the need for
relief."'85 Following the petition, the Secretary has thirty days in
which to grant or deny relief and to give reasons for denial.'86 Ex-
emptions could also be granted subject to conditions determined by
the Secretary.'
8 7
In reaching a decision, the Secretary is required to consider
certain factors. In case of unique hardship, he must consider:
(1) that no practicable domestic market exists; (2) the possibility of
serious financial loss; (3) petitioner's inability to obtain, except
through exports, an essential item for domestic use which is pro-
duced abroad from the controlled good; (4) the extent to which de-
nial of the petition would create conflict, detrimental to the
applicant, with other international agreements to which the United
States is a party; (5) possible adverse effects on the United States
economy; and (6) other relevant factors. 88 The Secretary must
also consider the effect that a favorable decision would have on
reaching the objectives of the short supply program. 89
Section 2408 of the 1979 Act contains no changes from its 1969
predecessor and continues to present a relatively uncomplicated
procedure. However, like several other provisions of the Act previ-
ously discussed, it gives no guidance to the Secretary in assessing
the priority among, or in according weight to, the factors he is re-
quired to consider. In particular, no definition is provided with re-
182. See id. at 374. Thus, for example, the Internal Revenue Code provides that partici-
pation in an international boycott may result in the reduction of certain benefits otherwise
allowable to U.S. shareholders of foreign controlled corporations and denial of tax deferrals.
26 U.S.C.A. § 999(b)(3).
183. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2408(a)(1).
184. Id. § 2408(a)(2).
185. Id.
186. Id. § 2408(b).
187. Id. § 2408(b).
188. Id. § 2408(c)(1).
189. Id. § 2408(c)(1) and (2).
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spect to the phrases "historically obtained from the United States"
or "any person who historically has exported such a good," in sec-
tion 2408(a). This section also fails to provide for reviewability of
the Secretary's decision. If indeed no right to review is available,
there is in effect no curb on the agency's discretion. It seems anom-
alous to permit appeals under the licensing procedures, 90 albeit of
very limited scope, but to .overlook it altogether in the hardship
case, especially if the economic impact on the exporter in both situ-
ations may be comparable. The consequence of this statutory
omission may be significant, for a petitioner can apparently claim
that the Secretary's discretion was not so broad as to totally pre-
clude judicial review. 191
. Miscellaneous Provisions
Several unrelated provisions merit consideration as these may
affect the ability of exporters to freely engage in foreign commerce.
These provisions are ancillary to the major sections discussed
190. See notes 64-93 supra, and accompanying text.
191. The prevailing rule today is that an agency decision is reviewable unless the matter
is so committed to agency discretion as to preclude review; that is, the statute which guides
agency action is drawn so broadly as to leave no law to apply in a given case. Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Thus, if the statute in question
gives plain and explicit directives, this restricts the scope of agency discretion, for then there
is applicable law, and the agency decision is reviewable. Id. In Volpe the statute in question
was the Federal Highway Act, which provided that the Secretary of Transportation "shall
not approve any program or project" that required the use of public parklands "unless
(1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program
includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park..." 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1964
ed., Supp. V); 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1964 ed., Supp. V). The Court found this statutory lan-
guage to be "a plain and explicit bar" to the use of federal funds for highway construction
through parks except in unusual situations. Id. at 410.
This rationale appears to apply, in the absence of dispositive case law, to the hardship
petitions under section 2408, since the Secretary is directed to consider several specific fac-
tors, and his decision must reflect consideration of these factors. He is thus barred from
acting unless he makes specific showings required by the Act. In this manner, Congress
appears to have limited the Secretary's discretion and raises the question whether he has
acted within the limits of applicable law. Accordingly, his decision should be reviewable,
and the failure to grant review would constitute denial of due process. Like the appeal pro-
cess in section 24090), however, the right of appeal under section 2408 may be limited to the
Secretary and not to the courts, except if there is abuse of discretion.
Reviewability also may be precluded if explicitly provided by statute. Abbott Laborato-
ries v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). Section 2408 of the 1979 Act contains no such express
provision, and section 2412(a) while exempting the act from the judicial review provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act, does not expressly preclude all judicial review. See gener-
ally K. DAVIS supra note 21, at 508-13; E. Gellhorn, supra note 132, at 243-47. See also
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 704, 60 Stat. 237, § 10(c); 80 Stat. 378.
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above, but persons subject to the 1979 Act should be alerted to
them.
1. Violations and Penalties. Section 2410 provides for sanc-
tions to be imposed for violations of the Act. Significantly, the
criminal penalties for willful or knowing violations are increased,
relative to the 1969 Act, to fines of not more than $100,000 or five
times the value of the export, whichever is greater, or a maximum
of ten years imprisonment or both. 19 2 Knowing violations of lesser
gravity are punishable by fines of up to $50,000 or five times the
value of the export, whichever is greater, or a maximum of five
years imprisonment or both.193 Finally, civil penalties of up to
$5,000 for each violation and suspension or revocation of the right
to export may be imposed. 194 No distinction is made with respect
to the penalties imposed between first and subsequent violations. 195
2. Confidentiality. Section 2411 contains a nondisclosure pro-
vision which states that except where Congress expressly provides
to the contrary, information which the government requires to be
furnished to it shall not be disclosed unless the Secretary of Com-
merce determines that nondisclosure is contrary to national secur-
ity.' 96 The Senate Committee expressed doubt that the public
interest would be served by requiring disclosure to foreign and do-
mestic competitors of United States firms of information such as
the value and nature of exports, the parties to the transaction and
shipping dates, where this information is provided to the govern-
ment pursuant to a license application.' 97 Thus, there is a strong
presumption in favor of confidentiality under the 1979 Act. The
opposite presumption would unnecessarily weaken the competitive
position of exporters, would not benefit government and might also
discourage exporters from being forthright.
3. Exemption from Administrative Procedure and Judicial Re-
view. Section 2412 of the 1979 Act takes something away but gives
something in return. Like its predecessor, 9 ' decisions made pursu-
192. EAA of 1969, supra note 3, § 2410(b).
193. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2410(a).
194. Id. § 2410(c).
195. See Senate Report, supra note 11, at 2479.
196. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2411(c).
197. Senate Report, supra note 11, at 2480.
198. EAA of 1969, supra note 3, § 2412.
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ant to section 2412 remain exempt from certain provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 199 However, that section
permits public participation, if practicable, in the writing of export
control regulations before being issued in final form and if regula-
tions imposing controls do not take effect immediately.2°
Section 2412 reflects the growing but still limited concern of
Congress for the procedural rights of exporters. Exempting the
1979 Act from the APA implies that in the special context of for-
eign affairs, insofar as it is consistent with the Constitution, the
1979 Act and any applicable case law provide the procedural guide-
lines. This framework, however, may inadequately protect the ex-
porter's interests because of the exemption from APA
requirements. There may in fact be no genuine national security or
foreign policy interest to protect, but this does not make the exemp-
tion inapplicable.20'
Additionally, section 2412 places no duty on the Secretary of
Commerce to invite or accept public comment. He can also disre-
gard such input entirely if immediately effective export regulations
must be instituted.20 2
4. Effect on Other Acts. Section 2416 states simply that the
EAA of 1979 has no effect on export controls established under
other acts.20 3 Thus, the exporter should not optimistically conclude
that simply because the goods or technology contemplated for ex-
port withstand the rigors of the 1979 Act they will not be barred
from export by some other statute.
III. CONCLUSION
Congress has taken measures to bring about improvements be-
lieved to be necessary in the area of export controls while preserv-
ing what is regarded as the strengths of the former statute.
199. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2412(a).
200. Id. § 2412(b).
201. The undesirable consequences of this circular argument have prompted some com-
mentators to assert that procedural safeguards in administrative decisions involving foreign
or military affairs should yield only if the risk to security is real and significant. See Bon-
field, Military and Foreign Affairs Function Rule-Making Under the APA, 71 MIcH. L. REV.
222 (1971); see also Timberg, Wanted- Administrative Safeguards for the Frotection of the
Individual in Economic Regulation, 17 AD. L. REV. 159 (1965).
202. EAA of 1979, supra note 10, § 2416.
203. The potential consequences of overly broad discretion have been previously dis-
cussed. See notes 50, 62, 78-82, 110-116 and 125-128 supra, and accompanying text.
43
Evrard: The Export Administration Act of 1979: Analysis of its Major Prov
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Exporters may benefit from the availability of the qualified general
license, the opportunity given to interested parties to comment
prior to implementation of export controls and attempts to reduce
administrative discretion. They may suffer, however, from overly-
broad discretion, from the inadequacy of hardship exemption pro-
cedures or from the general insufficiency of review. It may prove
most detrimental of all, in view of the other shortcomings of the
Act, that export activities are defined in terms of "ability" rather
than "rights," for that may effectively mean that the new Act is
little more than a cosmetic change. Whether the intended improve-
ments are realized or simply become unfulfilled aspirations will be
determined by the efficiency and sense of fairness with which the
statute is administered, the easing of burdens on exporters (prima-
rily with license applications) and perhaps most importantly the
viccissitudes of world events.
To say that the EAA of 1979 is an overall improvement com-
pared to its predecessor depends on who makes this assertion and
when it is made. The interest of Congress, the Executive and the
exporting community are all at stake at any given time, and these
are constantly influenced by often unpredictable events at home
and abroad. Thus, the liberalizing trend in export controls over the
past decade may again be temporarily curtailed as a result of the
Executive's response, for example, to further Soviet expansion be-
yond Afghanistan,2" to political upheaval among Middle East oil
producers or revolution in Central America.2 °5 Improved legisla-
tion is, therefore, a fluid notion subject to assessment in the light of
many factors and perhaps more so in the realm of foreign affairs.
The strength of a statute often lies in its ability to balance con-
flicting or competing interests in a manner satisfactory to the af-
fected parties. The EAA of 1979 recognizes the obvious situation in
which the government and the exporter seek objectives that may be
difficult to reconcile and further recognizes as never before that the
freedom to engage in foreign trade can bring nationwide benefits
that the government itself may be unable to achieve. However, the
1979 Act provides inadequate means to assess the relative weights
204. President Carter invoked the national security and foreign policy provisions of the
EAA of 1979, §§ 2404(c) and 2405(g)(3) as the statutory authority for imposing an embargo
on the shipment of agricultural commodities to the Soviet Union in response to its invasion
of Afghanistan. 16 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, No. 4, 183-84
(January 28, 1980).
205. See McQuade, supra note 62, at 100.
Vol. 12
44
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1 [], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol12/iss1/2
1982 EXPORT ADMINISTRATION AcT OF 1979 45
to be accorded to affected interests. To do that might require relax-
ation of the Executive's traditionally strong grip on foreign affairs.
There appears to be no reason to conclude at this juncture in the
history of export control legislation that Congress is prepared to
induce the Executive to relax that grip. It is premature to judge the
soundness of that broad policy. The best advice may be, therefore,
that the 1979 Act should be evaluated as it is implemented and
amended to solve the problems that emerge with practical experi-
ence.
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